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Abstract
This paper presents a formal and executable approach to capture the behaviour of
parties involved in a negotiation. A party is modeled as a negotiating agent com-
posed of a communication module, a control module, a reasoning module, and a
knowledge base. The control module is expressed as a statechart, and the reasoning
module as a defeasible logic program. A strategy specification therefore consists of
a statechart, a set of defeasible rules, and a set of initial facts. Such a specification
can be dynamically plugged into an agent shell incorporating a statechart interpreter
and a defeasible logic inference engine, in order to yield an agent capable of partici-
pating in a given type of negotiations. The choice of statecharts and defeasible logic
with respect to other formalisms is justified against a set of desirable criteria, and
their suitability is illustrated through concrete examples of bidding and multi-lateral
bargaining scenarios.
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1 Introduction
As the amount of commercial transactions carried out through the Internet increases at a
spectacular rate, the interest for partially or totally automating the negotiation of the terms
of these transactions has rapidly become a hot research topic. Consequently, automated
negotiation has evolved in a few years from a futuristic vision to a promising technology [24].
In particular, optimal strategies for several forms of automated bargaining and auctioning
under simplifying assumptions have been identified, and the extensions of these results to
more realistic settings have been studied by the game-theory and the distributed artificial
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intelligence communities [30, 32, 22]. Furthermore, several tournaments where automated
traders compete to maximize their profits in electronic auction houses have been organized
(e.g. [33, 20]), and their results are quite encouraging.
Software agents are becoming a choice technology for carrying out automated negoti-
ations [32]. In this approach, each party is represented through an agent which interacts
either directly with the other parties, or through a broker. The behaviour of the agent is
guided by a strategy, which may be as simple as continuously increasing the current offer
by the minimum increment up to a maximum amount (e.g. in the context of an English
auction or a bargaining scenario), or as complex as determining the next offer based on an
analysis of the history of all the previous offers and even that of previous negotiations [14, 9].
The issue in this context is thus “how to express a negotiation strategy?”.
An approach developed at MIT’s Kasbah project [7] in the setting of English auctions,
is to provide a set of simple pre-defined strategies, corresponding to linear, quadratic and
exponential functions over time. The authors argue that using pre-defined strategies has the
advantage that it makes the bidding agents’ decisions easily explainable and predictable.
However, this approach considerably restricts the possibilities of the users. In particular,
it is not applicable when the users’ valuation of the auctioned item depends upon that
of the other bidders (i.e. in correlated-value auctions [32]), since in this case, the bidding
function should dynamically adapt to the other participants’ bids. In addition, the use of
this approach in a broader setting than English auctions, implies that there will be one
set of alternative strategies for each negotiation protocol (i.e. one set of agents for each
variant of the double auction, another for each kind of bargaining, etc.).
At the other extreme, each participant involved in a negotiation could develop its own
negotiating agent “from scratch”, using a general-purpose design methodology and devel-
opment environment (see [29] for a list of agent building tools). Although this approach
is unavoidable when very complex strategies are considered, its systematic use leads to
time-consuming and hard-to-reuse development efforts. In addition, agents developed un-
der this approach have static functionalities, in the sense that it is often not possible to
modify their behaviour without having to rebuild them from scratch.
As an alternative to these extreme approaches, our aim is to develop a simple yet expres-
sive framework for specifying negotiating agents’ strategies, in a way that their decisions
are predictable and explainable. Specifically, we explore the suitability of defeasible logic
programming [5] for expressing the decision-making process of negotiating agents, coupled
with statecharts [18] for expressing their internal coordination. We argue that defeasible
logic is suitable for expressing negotiation strategies, since it straightforwardly captures
concepts such as preferences, hypotheses, arguments and counter-arguments. On the other
hand, statecharts provide a comprehensive and concise approach to express the possible
states and activities of a negotiating agent.
An important feature of the above approach is that it leads to plug-and-play negotiation
strategy specifications. Indeed, given an agent shell capable of interpreting statecharts and
defeasible logic programs, it is possible to dynamically plug a strategy specification into
this shell, so as to obtain a negotiating agent.
To validate the viability of our approach, we have applied it to several case-studies. In
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this paper, we develop two of them in details: one concerning an English auction, and the
other one concerning a one-to-many bargaining scenario, where one buyer simultaneously
bargains with several potential sellers in order to find an acceptable deal. This validation
work follows the preliminary results presented in [15], where we show how defeasible logic
can be used to express strategies for brokered trading, and for a simple case of bargaining.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce our approach and justify
our choices against a set of design criteria. Next, in section 3, we develop two case-studies
respectively involving an English auction and a bargaining scenario. Finally, in section 4
we compare our proposal to related ones, before concluding in section 5.
2 Rationale, approach, and enabling formalisms
2.1 Desiderata
Before choosing one or several languages for the specification of negotiation strategies, it
is important to establish a set of criteria that such languages need to satisfy. The criteria
presented below are inspired from those formulated by [19] in the context of techniques for
information modelling. They encompass several well-known principles of language design.
Firstly, a language for specifying negotiation strategies needs to be formal, in the sense
that its syntax and its semantics should be precisely defined. This ensures that the strategy
specifications can be interpreted unambiguously (both by machines and humans) and that
they are both predictable and explainable. In addition, a formal foundation is a prerequisite
for verification purposes.
Secondly, the language should be conceptual. This, following the well-known Conceptu-
alization Principle of [17], effectively means that it should allow its users to focus only and
exclusively on aspects related to strategies, without having to deal with any aspects related
to their realisation or implementation. Examples of conceptually irrelevant aspects in the
context that we consider are: physical data organisation and access, platform heterogeneity
(e.g. message-passing formats), and book-keeping (e.g. message queue management).
Thirdly, in order to ease the interpretation of strategies and to facilitate their docu-
mentation, the language should be comprehensible. Comprehensibility can be achieved by
offering a graphical representation, by ensuring that the formal and intuitive meanings are
as much in line as possible, and by offering structuring mechanisms (e.g. decomposition).
These structuring mechanisms often lead to modularity, which in our setting means that
a slight modification to a strategy should concern only a specific part of its specification.
Closely related to its comprehensibility, the language that we aim for, should be suitable,
that is, it should offer concepts close to those required in negotiations. In particular, the
language should be able to address the following aspects: coordination between concurrent
negotiation threads, communication with external parties, partial, incomplete and dynamic
descriptions, hypothetical reasoning, defeasibility/belief revision, and argumentation.
As we are interested in the automation of the negotiation process, the strategy descrip-
tion language should be executable, and its execution should exhibit acceptable perfor-
3
mances even for complex strategies involving many issues (i.e. the execution performances
should be scalable).
Finally, the language that we aim for should be sufficiently expressive, that is, it should
be able to precisely capture a wide spectrum of strategies.
2.2 An architecture for negotiating agents
We view a negotiation process as a set of software agents which interact in order to reach
an agreement. Agents participating in a negotiation can interact directly or through a
broker. In some situations, the role of a party during the negotiation process is almost
entirely carried out by the broker. This is the case for instance in some auction houses,
where the auction broker takes the place of the seller.
Following an abstract architecture for agents with memory presented in [36], each of
the software agents is composed of four modules: (i) a memory which contains the history
of the past decisions and interactions of the agent, including its current intentions, (ii) a
communication module responsible for receiving and sending messages to the other agents
and interacting with the user, (iii) a reasoning module which encodes the decision-making
part of the agent, and (iv) a control module which coordinates the other components. As
a refinement to this architecture, we choose to express the control module as a statechart
(see section 2.3), the reasoning module as a defeasible logic program (see section 2.4), and
the memory as a knowledge base of strict and defeasible facts. The architecture can then
be depicted as in figure 1.
Communication Layer
Control Module
queries/updates
Knowledge Base
revises
input events
output events
Reasoning Module
Statechart + Scripts
Protocol specification
Facts & Assumptions
Defeasible rules
activates
Figure 1: Architecture of a negotiating agent.
Conceptually, each time that a negotiating agent is notified of a change in the nego-
tiation status, it updates the base facts stored in the knowledge base accordingly, and it
activates the reasoning module. The reasoning module reads these facts from the knowl-
edge base, attempts to deduce new facts and refute existing ones, and updates the derived
facts stored in the knowledge base accordingly. Depending on the state of the knowledge
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base after this revision process, the control module determines whether it should ask the
communication module to submit a proposal or counter-proposal immediately, or it should
wait for some further event, or retract from the negotiation. It is also through the com-
munication module that the control module communicates with the agent responsible for
managing the user interface (which is not shown in figure 1). This separation between the
agent responsible for handling the negotiation process, and the one responsible for inter-
acting with the user (e.g. for collecting the parameters of the negotiation, or for displaying
its status), adds considerable flexibility to the architecture. In particular, these two agents
can be located in different machines, and the negotiating agent can even be mobile.
To summarise, a negotiation strategy is composed of a statechart, a set of “scripts”, a
defeasible logic program, a set of initial facts, and the addresses of the other parties involved
in the negotiation. This strategy is executed by an agent shell, composed of a statechart
interpreter, a defeasible logic inference engine, and a communication layer. Therefore, a
strategy can be seen as a plug-in component, which can be dynamically loaded into an
agent shell to obtain a negotiating agent.
2.3 Expressing internal coordination: Statecharts
When it comes to model control-flow, automata-based notations are a natural choice,
since they are conceptual, formal, executable, comprehensive, and suitable for modeling
concepts such as branching and loops. Among the many automata-based notations that
can be found in the literature, statecharts [18] have proven to be suitable for designing
complex systems, since they provide constructs for capturing concurrency, they offer a good
degree of modularity, and they provide better comprehensiveness than plain automata, by
considerably reducing the number of states and transitions required in a specification.
For these reasons, statecharts are widely used in the area of reactive systems devel-
opment, and are becoming a standard for intra-object coordination modeling, as they are
part of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [31]. In the sequel, we adopt UML’s syntax
of statecharts, which is slightly different from the one described in [18].
Statecharts are finite state machines whose states are optionally labeled by a name and
a list of actions, and whose arcs are optionally labeled by Event-Condition-Action rules.
The occurrence of an event can fire a transition if (i) the machine is in the source state of
the transition, (ii) the type of the event occurrence matches the event description attached
to the transition, and (iii) the condition of the transition holds. An event occurrence can
be the reception of a signal, a change in the system’s clock, or a change in the truth value
of a condition. The event, condition, and action parts of a transition are all optional. A
transition without an event is called a triggerless transition. Triggerless transitions are
enabled when the action(s) attached to their source state is (are) completed. On the other
hand, transitions labeled by events can fire during the execution of the sequence of actions
attached to their source state. In this case, this execution is interrupted.
A compound state is one whose action part is described itself as one or several state-
charts. Compound states come in two flavours: OR and AND. An OR-state contains a
single statechart, while an AND-state contains several statecharts which are intended to be
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executed concurrently. Each of these statecharts is called a concurrent region. Concurrent
regions are separated from each other by a dashed line. Composition is recursive, that is,
the substates of a compound state may themselves be decomposed either as OR-states or
as AND-states.
The statechart in figure 2 describes the control module of an agent participating in
three auctions. The agent starts by contacting each of the auctioneers in parallel, asking
for the current quote (see the three concurrent regions separated by dashed lines). As
soon as a quote arrives, it is inserted in the knowledge base, and when the three quotes
have arrived, the reasoning module is activated (see state “Auction selection”), so as to
determine whether a bid should be submitted, and to which auction. If a bid is submitted,
then the agent waits for an answer, which can be one of two: either another participant
overbids, in which case the whole process has to be restarted, or the bid wins the auction.
/ ask quote
quote_received/
update base
bid_won
/ ask quote
quote_received/
update base
over_bidden
Wait outcome 
/ ask quote
quote_received/
update base
[auction selected]/
send bidAuction selection
select auction
[no auction selected]
Wait quote 2Wait quote 1 Wait quote 3
Figure 2: Extract of the control module of an agent participating in several auctions
2.4 Expressing flexible decision-making: Defeasible Logic
Applying a negotiation strategy in a particular context is an intensive decision-making
process. While most aspects of this decision-making process could be fully captured in
classical logic programming (which has a formal semantics and has proven to be a power-
ful tool for building decision-making systems), this would put a burden on the developers of
strategies, since logic programming is a generic paradigm and offers nothing specific to deal
with the common characteristics of negotiation strategies such as argumentation, hypothet-
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ical reasoning, partial, incomplete and dynamic descriptions (see suitablity requirement in
section 2.1).
It is well known that non-monotonic reasoning is appropriate to model the above charac-
teristics [1]. Accordingly, we propose to express the decision-making aspects of negotiation
strategies using a language based on non-monotonic reasoning. Non-monotonic reasoning
is a complex phenomenon with many facets. Consequently, a plethora of non-monotonic
logics have emerged in the past years. Unfortunately, most of them have different and
sometimes incompatible intuitions, they are computationally intractable [6], and they have
been used only in a few standard toy examples, whereas real-life applications require low
complexity and the ability to handle more complicated cases.
In this paper, we advocate the use of Defeasible Logic (DL) [5] to model negotiation
strategies. This logic offers the advantages of non-monotonic reasoning for negotiation
strategy specification (such as the ability to handle partial, incomplete and dynamic de-
scriptions), while not suffering from the drawbacks mentioned above. The following are
the major reasons supporting this choice:
• A negotiation can be thought of as a dialogue between parties concerning the resolu-
tion of a dispute. This suggests that argumentation based reasoning formalisms are
suitable to characterise it. In [16], it was shown that DL can be characterised by an
argumentation semantics, thus the formal semantics of defeasible logic is in line with
the argumentative nature of negotiations.
• Given the close connection between derivations in DL and arguments, it follows that
negotiation strategies expressed in DL are explainable.
• In contrast to many other non-monotonic logics, DL is “skeptical”, meaning that it
does not support contradictory conclusions. Instead DL seeks to resolve conflicts. In
cases where there is some support for concluding A but also support for concluding
¬A, DL does not conclude any of them (thus the name “skeptical”). If the support
for A has priority over the support for ¬A then A is concluded. It can be argued
that non-skeptical reasoning is inappropriate for modeling decision-making processes
such as negotiations, since it is undesirable to deduce both that a decision should be
taken, and that it should not be taken.
• DL is representative of non-monotonic reasoning formalisms: many variants of DL
have been proposed and it has been shown that these variants are able to capture
most of the different intuitions of non-monotonic reasoning [2]. Moreover some of
these variants are equivalent to other non-monotonic formalisms [3].
• DL integrates the concept of priorities between rules, thereby supporting a direct
way of modeling preferences, without having to attach a metrics to them, as in the
case of approaches based on utility functions [28].
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• DL has a linear complexity, and existing implementations are able to deal with non
trivial theories consisting of over 100,000 rules [25], offering thus an executable and
scalable system.
A defeasible theory, i.e., a knowledge base in defeasible logic, consists of six different
kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules, defeasible rules, defeaters, a superiority relation ,
and a specification of conflicting literals.
Facts denote simple pieces of information that are deemed to be true regardless of other
knowledge items. A typical fact is that Tweety is an emu: emu(Tweety).
Strict and defeasible rules are represented, respectively, by expressions of the form
A1, . . . , An → B and A1, . . . , An ⇒ B, where A1, . . . , An is a possibly empty set of prereq-
uisites and B is the conclusion of the rule.
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises of a rule are given,
we are allowed to apply the rule and get a conclusion. When the premises are indisputable
(e.g. facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is “every emu is a bird”.
Written formally:
emu(X)→ bird(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of
such a rule is “birds usually fly”; written formally:
bird(X)⇒ fly(X).
The idea is that if we know that something is a bird, then we may conclude that it has the
capacity of flying, unless there is other evidence suggesting that it has not.
Defeaters are a special kind of rules. They are used to prevent conclusions, but never
to support them. For example
heavy(X) ¬fly(X)
This rule states that we have some reasons to believe that heavy things may not fly;
however our belief is a weak one and we do not want to conclude that something does not
fly only because it is heavy.
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules, that
is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given the
defeasible rules
r : bird(X) ⇒ fly(X)
r′ : emu(X) ⇒ ¬fly(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether an emu
can fly. But if we introduce a superiority relation  with r′  r, then we can indeed
conclude that the emu does not fly.
In this paper, we assume that the superiority relation is acyclic.
For each literal p we define the set of p-Complementary literals C(p), that is, the set of
literals that cannot hold when p does. Let us consider an example: suppose we have the
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predicates married and bachelor . Here, we define, for any constant a, C(married(a)) =
{¬married(a), bachelor(a)}. We know that, under the usual interpretation of the predicates
they cannot be true at the same time for one and the same individual. We stipulate that
the negation of a literal is always complementary to the literal.
We now give a short informal presentation of how conclusions are drawn in Defeasible
Logic. A conclusion P can be derived if there is a rule whose conclusion is P , whose
prerequisites (antecedent) are either already been proved or given in the case at hand
(i.e. facts), and any stronger rule whose conclusion is ¬P has prerequisites that fail to be
derived. In other words, a conclusion P is derivable when:
• P is a fact; or
• there is an applicable strict or defeasible rule for P , and either
– all the rules for ¬P are discarded or
– every rule for ¬P is weaker than an applicable strict or defeasible rule for P .
For a formal definition of derivability in defeasible logic and a discussion on some of
its properties see for example [5]. In what follows, we rather focus on the application
of defeasible logic to automated negotiation. Specifically, we sketch a set of guidelines
that can be used to formalize a negotiation strategy in defeasible logic. First of all, the
negotiating agent developer needs to conduct an information analysis in order to identify
an appropriate set of predicates to encode the negotiation strategy. These predicates
must collectively capture the information characterising a given negotiation situation (e.g.
negotiation issues, user parameters, thresholds, limit values, histories of offers, etc.) as
well as the conclusions that can be derived from a negotiation situation (e.g. the actions
that may need to be undertaken at a given point during the negotiation).
Next, the developer needs to identify the constraints over the negotiation, and the
business rules governing the negotiation strategy. These constraints and business rules
must then be classified as either hard or soft. Hard constraints (or hard business rules)
are those that apply in any situation, regardless of the context. These constraints set the
basic boundaries of the negotiating agent behaviour, and are used (for example) to model
decisions that must be systematically taken when a given condition holds. Hard constraints
and hard business rules are formalised directly as strict rules.
Soft constraints (or soft business rules) on the other hand can be violated under par-
ticular circumstances (i.e. they have exceptions). They are used to model the guidelines
and user preferences that the negotiating agent will consider after making sure that all the
hard constraints and rules are met. A soft constraint is formalized as a team of defeasible
rules. Specifically the soft constraint itself is first translated into a defeasible rule in this
team, and each exception to the constraint is then encoded as a separate defeasible rule,
whose conclusion is the negation of the conclusion of the defeasible rule corresponding to
the soft constraint. For example, if a soft constraint C is formalised by the defeasible
rule r1: A1, . . . , An ⇒ B (meaning that “normally” if A1, . . . , An hold, then so should B),
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and if we know that the state of affairs D constitutes an exception to C, then D must be
formalized as r2: D ⇒ ¬B. Since D is an exception to C, we have to specify that r2 has
precedence over r1, i.e. r2  r1.
In the third step, the developer should identify pairs of incompatible litterals. Two
litterals are said to be incompatible if they cannot both hold at the same time, which es-
sentially means that one of the litterals implies the negation of the other. Having identified
conflicting litterals, and with the aid of an inference tool, the developer can then detect
conflicting (defeasible) rules, i.e. rules such that the litterals appearing in the conclusions
are incompatible. As we have alluded to above, no conclusion can be drawn from conflict-
ing rules in defeasible logic, unless these rules are prioritised. For each pair of conflicting
defeasible rules, the developer must analyse what will happen when the conjunction of the
antecedents of the rules holds, and must deduce a priority between these rules from this
analysis. In some cases, this analysis can be partially supported by an automated tool.
Indeed, several criteria for automatically determining priorities among rules have been put
forth, one of the most common being the specificity criterion. In a nutshell, a rule is more
specific than another one, when it applies in all cases where the other does. In other words,
the set of prerequisites of the more general rule is a subset of the set of prerequisites of
the more specific rule. In such cases, it can be suggested to the developer to give a higher
priority to the more specific rule. However, the developer may decide to do the opposite,
since specificity alone is not always an appropriate criterion for ranking rules. In addition,
in general, two rules cannot be compared according to the specificity criterion, and thus,
the developer must either determine different ranking criteria or perform a manual ranking.
2.5 Glueing the control and the reasoning modules
In the example presented in figure 2, we used an informal syntax for describing the con-
ditions and actions labeling the transitions and states of the statechart. It is actually
in these conditions and actions, that the interaction between the control module and the
other modules is expressed.
Specifically, the conditions labeling the arcs of the state-charts are queries to the knowl-
edge base, while the actions fall within one of the following categories:
• Updates to non-derived predicates stored in the knowledge base.
• Activation of the reasoning module: that is, requesting the reasoning module to
compute the value for one or several derived predicates and refresh the knowledge
base accordingly.
• Sending a message to either a negotiating party or to the user through the commu-
nication module.
In the general case, these actions must be implemented using an external programming
language. However, many of them can be automatically generated by a tool for building
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negotiating agents. For instance, for each non-derivable predicate “P” appearing in the de-
feasible program, the tool could generate the corresponding action “set P” (e.g. set quote,
set current bid, etc.). In addition, the tool could provide implementations for actions such
as “revise(P)”, which would compute a value of the derived predicate P, and update the
knowledge base accordingly.
3 Case studies
Our approach to validate our proposal has been to use it in a number of case-studies
involving a variety of negotiation situations. We have in particular applied our approach
to design strategies for both bilateral and multi-party negotiation, and even to design
agents capable of concurrently participating in several alternative negotiations. In this
section, we detail two of the most representative case-studies that we have addressed: one
concerning an English auction, and the other one concerning a one-to-many bargaining
scenario, where one buyer simultaneously bargains with several potential sellers.
3.1 An English auction bidding agent
The English auction is perhaps one of the most popular one-to-many negotiation mech-
anisms. In its simplest form, it serves to select a buyer for an item and to establish its
price (multi-party single-issue negotiation). There are many variants of the English auc-
tion (see [23] for a survey). The variant that is currently in use within the biggest online
auction houses (e.g. eBay [10]) may be roughly described as follows. The seller starts by
setting a reservation price, which may or may not be announced to the bidders. He also
sets a timing constraint, which may be either expressed as a firm deadline, as a maximum
duration between two successive bids, or as both. Potential buyers then issue increasingly
higher bids. The increment between one bid and the next is constrained to be greater than
a given threshold. The auction stops when the timing constraint is violated, i.e. either
the deadline is reached, or no bid is registered for longer than the established maximum
duration. The last bidder then buys the item at the price of the last bid. If no bid is issued
at or above the reservation price, the item is not sold.
To illustrate how a bidder’s strategy is expressed using defeasible logic, we consider the
following scenario. A user wishes to participate in the auction of an item. (S)he doesn’t
know exactly how much the item is worth, but (s)he thinks that its value lies somewhere
within two bounds L and U. The user is keen not to over-value the item, so (s)he decides
to assume at the beginning of the auction that the item is worth L, and to eventually
increase his valuation whenever one of the following two situations occurs: (a) at least 3
bids above his/her current valuation have been registered, or (b) somebody has bid more
than 20% of his/her current valuation. As soon as one of these conditions is met, the
user will raise his valuation by the minimum possible amount that allows him/her to stay
in the auction. However, (s)he will never value the item above U. As usual in the case
of English auctions, the user will start by bidding the reservation price (or the minimum
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possible bid if the reservation price is not known), and (s)he will subsequently overbid the
other participants’ bids by the minimum increment, as long as the resulting bid is less than
his/her current valuation. However, if the auction’s deadline is too close, (s)he will bid his
current valuation instead of just overbidding by the minimum increment1.
Formally, the parameters, status, and history of the auction, are modeled through the
following predicates and constants:
• Constant min increment denotes the minimum amount by which the bidders are
allowed to overbid.
• Constant initial bid denotes the minimum amount of the first acceptable bid.
• Predicate time remaining(T ) gives the time remaining before the end of the auction.
• Predicate highest quote(N) provides the current highest bid.
• Predicate quotes above(X,N) holds if N bids above amount X have been registered.
The last two predicates (highest quote and quotes above) provide aggregate views over
the history of the negotiation process as seen by the agent. This history is captured by a
predicate history(L), where L is a list of pairs 〈time, proposal〉. In the case of an auction,
the proposals are the price quotes received by the agent from the auction broker. The rules
for deriving predicates highest quotes and quotes above out of predicate price quotes are
all strict (i.e. not defeasible), and therefore we omit them in the sequel.
The parameters and decision rules of the user’s strategy are modeled by the following
constants and predicates:
• Constant time threshold is the duration to the deadline, below which the user esti-
mates that he should bid his/her valuation instead of just overbidding by the mini-
mum increment.
• Constant significant bidders is the number of bidders that should bid above The
user’s current valuation before (s)he considers raising it.
• Constant significant increment is the amount (expressed as a percentage), that
another bidder should bid above the user’s current valuation before (s)he considers
raising it (in the working example this is 0.2).
• Constant max valuation is self-explanatory.
• Predicates submit bid(X) states that a bid of amount X should be submitted.
• Predicate valuation(X) gives the current valuation while pre valuation(X) gives the
valuation that was valid at the end of the previous activation of the reasoning module.
1The reasoning module that we develop here can be easily adapted to capture strategies where the
increment between one bid and the next is gradually increased as the deadline approaches.
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• Predicate my bid(X) gives the amount of the last accepted bid issued by the bidder.
At the beginning of the auction my bid(0) holds.
The rules modeling the strategy are:
r1: my bid(X), highest quote(Y ), valuation(Z), X < Y, Y +min increment < Z,
time remaining(T ), T > time threshold⇒ submit bid(Y +min increment)
r2: my bid(X), highest quote(Y ), valuation(Z), X < Y, Y +min increment < Z,
time remaining(T ), T ≤ time threshold⇒ submit bid(Z)
r3: pre valuation(X)⇒ valuation(X)
r4: pre valuation(X), quotes above(X,N), N ≥ significant bidders, highest quote(Y )
⇒ valuation(Y +min increment)
r5: pre valuation(X), highest quote(Y ), Y > (1 + significant increment)×X
⇒ valuation(Y +min increment)
r6: Y > max valuation ¬valuation(Y ).
Rules r4 and r5 have precedence over r3.
The sets of complementary literals state that there can only be one amount to bid, and
one new valuation, i.e.
• C(submit bid(x)) = {¬submit bid(y) | y 6= x}
• C(new valuation(x)) = {¬new valuation(y) | y 6= x}
Rules r1 and r2 model the bidding strategy: Rule r1 states that if there is enough
time remaining and the agent’s current bid is not the highest one, it should be increased
by the minimum increment, provided that the current valuation allows so. Rule r2 states
that if the deadline is close and the bidder does not hold the item, a bid of the amount
of the current valuation should be submitted immediately. Rules r3 through r6 model
the evolution of the valuation: Rule r4 and r5 model the two conditions under which the
valuation should be raised, while rule r6 is a defeater modeling the fact that the bidder is
under no circumstances willing to value the item above a given amount. The use of this
defeater provides a strong modularity to the defeasible program. If for instance the user
wanted to modify the above strategy with a statement of the form “raise the valuation if
the reservation price has not been met and the highest bid is above my current valuation”,
then (s)he just has to extend the above defeasible logic program with the following rule :
r7 reservation not met, valuation(X), highest quote(Y ), Y > X
⇒ valuation(Y +min increment)
r7  r3
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without having to worry whether the reservation price is greater than his/her maximum
valuation or not.
The control module of the bidding agent is described as a statechart in figure 3. The left
region of the statechart is responsible for invoking the inference engine. At the beginning
of the process, the knowledge base contains the fact ∂ submit bid(initial bid). Accordingly,
the agent contacts the auctioneer to submit a bid (using action send bid). If the bid is
accepted, the agent receives a message which, when processed by the communication layer,
generates the event bid accepted. When a bid is accepted, the agent introduces a fact of
the form my bid(X) into the knowledge base and waits until a new quote is inserted. If on
the other hand, a submitted bid is rejected, this means that another participant bid the
same or a higher amount before the submission was processed, and therefore, the agent
receives a quote with this amount instead of an acceptance message. Quotes are handled
by the rightmost region of the statechart, which inserts them into the knowledge base, and
generates a quote inserted event after each insertion. These events are consumed by the
left concurrent region.
start
quote_inserted(P)[M <= P]
update_time_remaining;
revise(submit_bid);
bid_accepted/set_my_bid(M)
 Wait acceptance
quote_inserted(P)[M <= P]
quote(P)/insert_quote(P)
end(winner)[winner = self]/notify_win end(winner)[winner != self]/notify_loss
Wait overbid
[else]
update_pre_valuation
[submit_bid(M), highest_quote(H), M <= H]
Infer
[submit_bid(M), highest_quote(H), M > H]/send_bid(M)
 Wait Quote
Figure 3: Specification of the control module of a bidding agent in an English auction.
When the inference engine cannot deduce a fact of the form ∂ submit bid(M), the
control module takes the transition labeled “else” in figure 3, which leads to state “Wait
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overbid”. From then on, it waits for new quotes and when it receives one, it updates the
knowledge base and invokes the inference engine again.
As stated in section 2.5, the conditions labeling the transitions of the statechart are
queries to the knowledge base, while the actions correspond to updates, as well as invo-
cations of the communication and the reasoning module. Some of these actions, such as
“revise”, “set previous valuation” and “set my bid” are predefined or can be automatically
generated from the profiles of the corresponding predicates. Others such as “notify win”
and “notify loss” have to be coded in an external programming language.
3.2 Bargaining with multiple parties
In a bargaining setting, the negotiation process begins with an initial offer formulated by
one of the parties, and proceeds with an alternate exchange of offers, which stops when
either an agreement is reached, or one of the parties decides to terminate the negotiation
without an agreement. In many realistic scenarios, a party is not involved in a single
bargaining process at a time, but rather, several bargainings over the same issue take
place concurrently. This is the case for an individual who contacts several merchants in
search of the best terms for buying a product. Under this perspective, the decision to
terminate a given negotiation thread (i.e. a negotiation with a given party), and even
the strategy for formulating a counter-offer, is dependent on the progress and outcomes of
other negotiations threads. A negotiating agent for this kind of scenarios should therefore
have a global view of all the negotiations in which the party that it represents is involved.
In this section, we focus on single-issue bargaining with non-binding offers. By “non-
binding” we mean that when a party P1 sends an offer to another party P2, if P2 wishes
to accept this offer, it needs to ask P1 for confirmation. It is not until P1 confirms its offer
that that the negotiation is terminated with an agreement. If P1 refuses to confirm its
offer, then it must either formulate a new offer or terminate the negotiation. This protocol
is appropriate for situations where an agent negotiates with several others concurrently.
Indeed, if offers were binding, an agent sending an offer would have to wait for the offer
to be accepted or rejected before sending any offer to another party, and the concurrency
would thus be limited.
We consider an agent responsible for negotiating a price with several potential sellers
on behalf of a buyer. The control module of this agent is modeled as a statechart in
figure 4. Offers sent by the sellers are arranged in a queue. The left concurrent region
of the statechart describes how the offers are unqueued and evaluated. The outcome of
the evaluation of an offer can be one of three actions: accept the offer, propose a counter-
offer, or terminate the negotiation with the corresponding party. If an offer is accepted,
the negotiating agent asks the other party to confirm the agreement, and upon receiving
confirmation, it terminates the whole negotiation process (i.e. all the threads). If on the
other hand a message of confirmation refusal is received, or the confirmation message is not
replied after an agreed delay, an occurrence of event “no confirmation(P,F)” is generated,
and the agent continues to negotiate with the other parties.
The rightmost region of the statechart is responsible for receiving offers and termina-
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receive_termination(P)/delete(P)
receive_offer(P, F)/insert_offer(P, F)
notify_agreement(P,F);
terminate_all
send_confirmation(P);
confirmation_request(P, F)/
evaluate_best_offer
[no_offers] offer_inserted(P,F)
[accept(P,F)]/ask_confirmation(P,F)
select_best_offer
time_out no_more_parties/notify_failure
confirmed(P,F)/notify_agreement(P,F); terminate_all
Wait_Offer
Wait_Confirm
Offer_Evaluation
no_confirmation(P, F)
[terminate(P)]/send_termination(P)
[counter_offer(P,F)]/send_counter_offer(P,F);
Figure 4: Specification of the control module of a multi-party bargaining agent.
tion messages from the sellers. When there are no more potential sellers remaining, the
negotiation process is terminated with a failure. Similarly, when a party is willing to ac-
cept the last counter-offer that has been sent to it (i.e. a confirmation for a counter-offer is
requested), a confirmation message is sent and the whole negotiation process is terminated.
Notice that it is not the buyer but the sellers who are responsible for generating the
initial offers. Accordingly, we will use the term “offer” to designate the prices proposed by
the sellers, and the term “counter-offer” to refer to the prices proposed by the buyer.
The reasoning module of the negotiating agent is composed of two separate defeasible
logic programs: one for selecting the next offer to be evaluated, and the other for evaluating
an offer. The rules for selecting an offer are simple (pick the offer with the lowest price
among those which have not yet been evaluated), and we therefore omit their description.
The predicates for evaluating a given offer are:
• offer(P,X) : The current offer of party P is X (we assume that X is an integer).
• previous offer(P,X) : The previous offer of party P was X. If P has not made any pre-
vious offer, then the defeasible logic inference engine will deduce ¬previous offer(P,X).
• counter offer(P,X) : The reasoning module suggests to reply to P’s most recent
offer with counter-offer X.
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• previous counter offer(P,X) : The counter-offer suggested by the reasoning module
in response of P’s second most recent offer was X.
• accept(P) : The inference engine suggests to accept P’s most recent offer.
• terminate(P) : The inference engine suggests to stop negotiating with P.
Finally, the rules involving these predicates are:
r1: offer(P, Y ),¬previous offer(P,Z), Y > good offer ⇒ counter offer(P, good offer)
If this is the first offer from P and that it is not good enough, ask for a good price.
r2: offer(P, Y ), previous offer(P,Z), Y ≥ Z ⇒ terminate(Z)
If P has not improved his offer with respect to the previous one, stop negotiating.
r3: offer(P, Y ), previous offer(P,Z), Y < Z, previous counter offer(P,X), best offer(W )
⇒ counter offer(P,min(X − increment ,W ))
If P has improved his offer with respect to the previous one, then concede a small
amount with respect to the previous counter-offer. However, do not counter-propose
a price below the current best offer.
r4: few parties , offer(P, Y ), best offer(Z), Y ≤ Z, Y ≤ acceptable price ⇒ accept(P, Y )
If there are few parties remaining and that the offer of P is acceptable and it is the
the best one that has been received, accept it. A similar rule could be used to take
into account the situation where the deadline for reaching an agreement is close.
r5: offer(P, Y ), Y ≤ good price ⇒ accept(P, Y )
If somebody offers a good price, accept it.
Rules r4 and r5 both have precedence over r1, r2 and r3.
4 Related work
The Michigan AuctionBot [27, 38] is an auction management server supporting the creation,
location and enactment of different kinds of auctions. Users can manually interact with
the system through an HTML-based interface, or alternatively, they can develop their own
arbitrarily complex bidding agents, and connect them to the auction manager through a
TCP-level API. This API is generic enough to deal with several kinds of auctions (e.g.
English, Dutch, double, etc.) through a common set of primitives. The AuctionBot has
recently been used to host a trading agent competition [33], as has another similar platform
called FishMarket [20]. Unlike our work, neither FishMarket nor the AuctionBot, address
the issue of specifying bidding agent strategies.
Many efforts in the area of automated negotiation have focused on applying game theory
techniques, either to design a protocol that encourages the participants to adopt a desirable
strategy, or to design an optimal strategy for a given protocol [30, 32]. Although this
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approach yields interesting results under simplifying assumptions (e.g. known valuations,
risk-neutral attitudes, computationally unbounded agents), it is difficult or impossible to
apply them in some realistic situations [22]. For this reason, [11] advocates the use of
heuristic-based approaches in cases where game theoretic techniques are not applicable.
Our work is complementary to the above ones, since we do not address the issue of designing
strategies, but rather that of specifying them in an executable form.
[13] suggests to use a “variant” of defeasible logic to express strategies for agents trading
over stock markets. The defeasible logic considered in this reference does not support an
explicit ranking of the rules within a theory, but rather derives this ranking through a
specificity criteria over arguments. Roughly speaking, an argument is more specific than
(and therefore can defeat) another argument, if it takes into account more information.
In addition to the fact that this approach allows tie-breaks between defeasible arguments,
it may sometimes lead to counter-intuitive situations, since the semantics given by a user
to the concept of “more information”, may potentially not be in line with that given by
the defeasible logic’s inference method. Another important difference between the above
proposal and ours, is that the control module is expressed through Prolog rules. We believe
that event-driven formalisms such as statecharts, are more appropriate for this purpose.
Grosof et al. [8] use Courteous Logic Programming (CLP) to express knowledge about
user preferences, constraints, and negotiation structures. The authors do not address the
issue of specifying bidding strategies, but rather that of determining the set of auctions and
other negotiations that need to be undertaken in order to transform a contract template
into an executable contract. Interestingly, Defeasible Logic (DL) is more expressive than
CLP, in the sense that it fully supports stratified theories [3]. Hence, the question remains
open whether it is possible to express “useful” contract templates in DL that are not
expressible in CLP.
In this paper, we did not address the issue of inter-agent message exchange. For some
negotiation protocols such as the English and the Dutch auctions, some standardisation
proposals are being developed by the FIPA organisation [12]. Also, inter-agent communi-
cation protocols such as KQML [34] could be used for this purpose.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a pragmatic approach to negotiating agents development, which seam-
lessly combines an imperative formalism (statecharts) with a declarative one (defeasible
logic). The choice of these two formalisms has been justified against a set of desirable
criteria for negotiation strategy specification languages, and their suitability has been val-
idated through concrete examples of non-trivial negotiation strategies. In particular, we
have shown that this approach is applicable for developing agents capable of participating
in multiple concurrent negotiations.
All the defeasible logic programs appearing in the paper have been tested using a
defeasible logic inference engine [26]. Currently, the translation of the statechart into an
executable program is carried out manually. However, it is clear that this process could be
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automated, and as a matter of fact, there exist several commercial tools for generating code
from a statechart (e.g. Statemate Magnum [21]). Alternatively, an interesting approach
would be to develop an interpreter of statecharts, which combined with a defeasible logic
inference engine, and an appropriate inter-agent communication library, could be used to
build an agent shell capable of dynamically loading and executing negotiation strategies
expressed in our framework.
In this paper, we have advocated the use of (defeasible) rules to specify the decision-
making aspects of negotiation strategies. It is conceivable however to use rules not only
for specifying negotiation strategies, but also for expressing the offers and counter-offers
exchanged between agents during a negotiation. Allowing agents to exchange rules, in-
stead of just exchanging simple communication performatives, significantly increases the
flexibility of a negotiation protocol. Indeed, agents can then dynamically add, remove, or
modify issues. They can also express entire spaces of acceptable deals in a single message,
instead of expressing only one acceptable deal per message. This idea, which is suggested
in [37, 8], is certainly worth further investigation.
Another avenue for future work is the integration of defeasible logic, as a formalism for
qualitatively expressing preferences, with a quantitative formalism such as Multi-Attribute
Utility Theory (MAUT). Indeed, the application of MAUT to capture preferences and
trade-offs over multiple issues in the context of both manual and automated negotiations,
has been thoroughly studied [28, 11, 4]. MAUT-based approaches to strategy specification
are especially suitable in situations where it is intuitive to attach metrics to both the
negotiation issues and the user preferences. In contrast, the logic-based approach presented
in this paper is suitable when there is no intuitive way of defining such metrics, but instead
the user has in mind a set of prioritised guidelines to find acceptable deals. The marriage
of these two types of formalisms (quantitative and qualitative) can thus lead to a powerful
approach for specifying negotiation strategies.
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